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Waltenberger and Ruff-Stahl: Implications of Short Scheduled Ground Times

One of the main characteristics of LCCs (low-cost carriers) is short
turnaround times (Barret, 2004), which allows these airlines to maximize the
number of flights per day and airplane utilization. If these short turnaround times
cannot be met, the LCC’s on-time performance will suffer. Hence for LCCs, the
airtime of their airplanes is seemingly more important than customer satisfaction.
Traditional airlines, in turn, allow longer ground times in exchange for better ontime performance and thus happier customers. Good on-time performance is of
increasing importance to LCCs too, as they are trying to attract delay-sensitive
customers from the business segment (Klophaus, Conrady & Fichert, 2012). So
far, little research has been directed to the comparison between low-cost carriers
and traditional airlines regarding on-time performance and scheduled turnaround
times.
Jetzki (2009) published the latest and most comprehensive work on this
issue, showing differences between low-cost carriers and traditional scheduling
models in terms of ground times and the ability to absorb delay. While different
strategies to minimize delay amongst different carriers were identified, the
company names were not disclosed due to confidentiality reasons. Even after
Jetzki’s study, it is still unclear whether traditional airlines should change their
turn around model to improve efficiency while still maintaining customer
satisfaction.
This paper is intended as a first step to close this gap in research by
examining airlines’ on-time performance, turnaround scheduling practices, and
block times exemplarily at Valencia airport and correlating these values to the
carriers’ financial performance. To avoid confidentiality issues, this is done by
using publicly available data from flightradar24.com. Under investigation will be
the three industry leaders in European LCC operations, Ryanair (FR), EasyJet
(U2), and Eurowings (EW), and for comparison two successful network airlines,
Lufthansa (LH) and British Airways (BA).
Review of Literature
The Business Case of European Low-Cost Carriers
Over the last three decades, the low-cost segment in Europe’s airline
business has risen dramatically, gaining a market share of 41% in 2016 in the EU
(Airbus, 2016). Consequently, and for economic reasons, traditional airlines had
to adapt their business models and increasingly adopt LCC-type strategies. To
differentiate LCCs from traditional airlines, Klophaus et al. (2012) have identified
13 criteria, which are usually found in the low-cost segment: Secondary airport
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usage, point-to-point services only, no code sharing, one-way fares only, no more
than one fare at any time, no more than two fares at any time, single class cabin,
no complimentary in-flight service with lowest fare category, complimentary inflight service with highest fare category, no free checked baggage with lowest
fare category, free checked baggage with highest fare category, no frequent flyer
program. If a low-cost airline satisfied all 13 criteria, it reached a reference value
of one. Vice versa, if an airline – for example, Lufthansa – scored not a single
low-cost criterion, this led to an overall reference value of zero.
While Ryanair scored first with a reference value of one, the average score
of all examined 21 European carriers in the year 2012 was 0.54. However,
Ryanair has announced to offer connecting flights (Ryanair, 2017) since then and
EasyJet started the distribution of tickets through a global distribution system
(Sabre, 2016). These examples show that LCCs themselves start shifting their
business models toward more traditional ways to earn money in air transportation,
mainly through the selection of primary airports and routes and by attracting
customers via new fare structures and services.
Maximizing Utilization Through Short Ground Times
One remaining significant difference between LCCs and traditional
airlines is the turnaround of an airplane between landing (precisely: the on-block
time of the aircraft) and next takeoff (precisely: the off-block time of the aircraft).
The scheduled length of a turnaround is a trade-off between aircraft utilization
rate and the ability to absorb delay, thereby maintaining on-time performance.
The significant advantage of LCCs in comparison to traditional airlines has
always been their ability to turn around aircraft on the ground quicker. This ability
leads to higher utilization of the aircraft, as the plane spends comparatively more
time in the air through a more substantial number of flights per day (Barret,
2004). Short turnaround times can be achieved by 1) cleaning the cabin between
flights by the cabin crew instead of a ground crew, 2) reduced food service on
board, and 3) reduced delivery process (if at all), and 4) optimized turnaround
procedures (Barret, 2004).
Short ground times are easier to achieve at smaller airports due to shorter
taxi times and a by comparison larger number of available gates (Barret, 2004).
However, the advantage of short turnarounds decreases with increasing travel
distance, as more extended airtime per flight leads to fewer turnarounds per day
(Belobaba, 2016).
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The disadvantage of short ground times is the missing slack time that is
often used to absorb previously generated delay. This leads to a greater degree of
vulnerability to disturbances and therefore delay cascades quickly throughout the
system. LCCs seem to be generally less capable of absorbing delay in comparison
to other airlines, and Jetzki (2009) pointed out that “every minute of primary
delay created more than one minute of reactionary delay for this type of business
model” (p. 41). Fricke and Schultz (2009) have investigated turnarounds of
traditional Lufthansa operations at Munich and Frankfurt and found that pilots
were only able to absorb 4.5 minutes of delay on an average leg length of 79
minutes, which indicates that in-air options for absorbing delay are insufficient.
In contrast to traditional airlines, LCCs are usually scheduling shorter
ground times to increase aircraft utilization rates, even at the cost of lower ontime performance and a large portion of reactionary delay.
The Costs of Delay
Low on-time performance values are generally considered undesirable
because they generate costs for airlines and passengers alike with an enormous
impact on the economic performance of an airline. Cook and Tanner (2015) found
that 15 minutes of delay at the gate usually cost 550€ for an A320 or a B738, two
aircraft models frequently used by LCCs. These values roughly double for enroute
delays, for example, due to arrival management at busy airports or for re-routing
due to air traffic flow management (ATFM) regulations.
While many aspects of delay can be calculated easily through input
variables such as crew and fuel costs, maintenance, and reactionary delay factors,
other aspects such as passenger cost remains a vague guess. Cook and Tanner
(2015) differentiate between ‘hard costs’ such as rebooking, compensation, and
care and ‘soft costs’ including passenger dissatisfaction and customer disloyalty.
Counterintuitively, early arrivals may also be costly for airlines as gates
may be still blocked. Hao and Hanson (2013) estimate costs for early arrivals to
be below the costs for delays, but still considerable for airlines when planning
their schedules. Cook (2007) indicated that “just five minutes of unused buffer, atgate, for a B767-300ER, would amount to well over €50,000 over a period of one
year, on just one leg per day” (p. 118). While this aircraft type is much larger than
the types usually used by European low-cost carriers, the example illustrates the
importance of on-time performance and adequately scheduled block times, which
will be discussed in the following section.
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In sum, any form of positive or negative delay will result in additional
costs for an airline. However, late arrivals and the associated reactionary delay
will generate considerably more costs for airlines than early arrivals. Those early
arrivals may be planned as idle times for crew and aircraft and may help to absorb
previously generated delay. Depending on the specific situation of serviced
airports, early arrivals may be useful to prevent the build-up of delay.
The Importance of Managing Block Times
Delay is always associated with cost. Hence, the scheduling of appropriate
block times is of great importance to minimize the build-up of delay. Hao and
Hansen (2013) have demonstrated that ample block time scheduling is a powerful
tool to improve an airline’s on-time performance – however at the cost of
efficiency and utilization rates. For new routes, airlines at first estimate the
required block time in advance based on flight plans. As soon as actual data is
gathered, most airlines adopt the scheduled block time accordingly. Block time
setting techniques vary. Some airlines set a single block time for a specific route
for an entire year, while other carriers consider seasons of the year, days of the
week, and time of the day.
Even though LCCs increasingly converge their business models toward
traditional airlines in Europe, their on-time performance still lags behind
traditional carriers, and there are no indications that LCCs strive to close this gap
and improve their on-time performance (Flightontime.info, 2017). It seems that
from an economic standpoint, a lower on-time performance overall outweighs the
associated costs. Hence, it is the purpose of this study to evaluate whether there is
still a difference between the on-time performance of LCCs and traditional
airlines. As a case study, this study will examine the scheduled turnaround times,
and block-time setting practices at Valencia airport (VLC) and correlate the
findings to the airlines’ financial performance.
Method
This quantitative study sought to determine if the economic gains of lower
on-time performance of low-cost carriers outweigh the costs. The following data
were analyzed to evaluate such costs and benefits.
Flight Data
Data for flights operated by Ryanair, EasyJet, Eurowings, Lufthansa, and
British Airways to and from the airport of Valencia (Spain) was retrieved from
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flightradar24.com. The airport was selected for two reasons: First, it is located in
a region that is frequently visited by travelers from northern Europe and is,
therefore, a destination for LCCs and traditional airlines alike. Second, the
number of flight movements is large enough to expect a sufficiently large data set.
Finally, the flight time between the airport and several northern European
Destinations is approximately the same (DUS, FRA, LGW, LTN, MUC, STR:
113 – 131 minutes), which is relevant for the evaluation of block times. Data were
retrieved for July, August, and September 2017.
The data may be expected to be highly reliable due to the method used by
flightradar24.com collecting the data. Errors are expected to be within +/- one
minute due to the quick changes in airspeed, altitude, and position during takeoff
and landing. Besides reliability, the validity of the data may be considered high
for flight times between the airports. For some calculations, average taxi times
were added to average flight times to calculate average delay and block times.
Duration and delay were converted into minutes and analyzed through an
ANOVA.
Table 1
Formulas
departure delay
arrival delay
scheduled turnaround
time
actual ground time
scheduled block time

= Actual takeoff time (ATT) – standard departure time
(STD)
= Actual landing time (ATL) – standard arrival time
(STA)
= Scheduled departure time STD (subsequent flight) –
scheduled arrival time (STA) (preceding flight)
= Actual departure time (ATD) (subsequent flight) –
actual arrival time (ATA) (preceding flight)
= STA - STD

Note. All results are calculated in minutes. Delay is positive when aircraft are late.

Financial Data
Financial Data was retrieved from the respective annual reports of all
carriers (British Airways plc., 2017; EasyJet, 2016; Lufthansa, 2017; Ryanair,
2016) as available for the financial year 2016. On-time performance was only
reported by Ryanair, and data was completed through numbers from an OAG
(2016) report for the other carriers.
Possible major one-off effects mentioned in the annual reports were
corrected and the data was then organized along with the operational performance
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indicators in a table to allow easy comparison for the reader. Due to the definition
of the financial year for all carriers, no data was available to match the study
period with current numbers from the summer 2017 season.
Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that the economic gains of lower on-time performance
of low-cost carriers outweigh the costs.
Results
The findings revealed significant differences among the various carriers,
however not along the lines between low-cost-carriers and traditional airline
models. Significant differences were found for on-time performance, turnaround
scheduling strategies, actual turnaround lengths, and block-time calculations.
On-Time Performance
In this section, the actual takeoff-times of all carriers were compared
through statistical analysis. Figure 1 and Table 2 show the results and indicate that
there are two groups of airlines, which are not divided by the traditional
separating line that was expected to be found between low-cost and non-low-cost
operations.
The first group consists of the two legacy airlines British Airways and
Lufthansa, as well as Ryanair as a quite punctual base operator at VLC.
Eurowings and EasyJet make up the second group with a significantly lower ontime performance, which was confirmed through an ANOVA analysis with F(4,
1052) = 51.91, p < 0.0001. A post hoc Tukey HSD test (see table A2) revealed
that the differences between Ryanair and Lufthansa, between Ryanair and British
Airways, between Lufthansa and British Airways, and between EasyJet and
Eurowings were not significant. All other comparisons between the carriers
showed significant differences in on-time departure performance.
Similar results regarding statistical significance were found for the arrival
delays of flights originating from VLC. Only Ryanair and Lufthansa touched
down on average before their scheduled on-block time. All other carriers seemed
to operate on average late on their routes from Valencia.
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Figure 1. Boxplot of departure delay for flights leaving from VLC. Whiskers identify
extreme values.
Table 2
Delay for Flights Departing from VLC
Departure Delay

Arrival Delay
MD - M A

Carrier

Abbreviation

n

MD

SD

MA

SD

Ryanair

FR

300

17.1

27.5

-1.5

28.2

18.6

EasyJet

U2

310

38.5

31.4

22.5

32.3

16.0

Eurowings

EW / 4Ua

143

37.7

31.8

19.7

34.5

18.0

Lufthansa

LH

229

18.3

14.3

-6.1

13.6

24.4

British Airways

BA

75

25.7

22.2

2.8

22.4

22.9

Note. All results are calculated in minutes. Delay is positive when aircraft are late.
a
Germanwings (4U) was included because it operates exclusively as a contractor for EW.

Turnarounds
As noted earlier, a quick and efficient turnaround is key to high equipment
productivity, and thus a primary component of the current low-cost strategy.
Therefore, turnarounds at VLC airport were compared for on-time performance
above. Because only STA (standard time of arrival), ATL (actual landing time),
STD (standard departure time), and ATT (actual takeoff time) were available, the
calculation of the actual turnaround times required a two-step process. In a first
step, average taxi-in (M = 4, SD = 2) and taxi-out times (M = 11, SD = 4) from
summer 2016 were added to the actual landing time (ATL) and subtracted from
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the actual takeoff time (ATT) of each flight. Average taxi times were retrieved
from EUROCONTROL (2016a, 2016b) and are depicted in Table A1.
In a second step, early arrivals that were still early after the addition of
taxi-in time were set to schedule on-block time for further data evaluation. This
was necessary to count only those turnarounds as longer-than-scheduled that
exceeded the scheduled off-block time. Otherwise, an aircraft that arrived ten
minutes early at the gate would have been considered late regarding scheduled
turnaround time, even if it left five minutes before scheduled off-block time. The
results are depicted in Table 3, which indicates significant differences among the
different airlines for scheduled turnaround lengths and actual durations.
Table 3
Scheduled and Actual Turnaround Times at VLC
Actual a

Scheduled
Carrier

n

MS

Ryanair

207

54.9 35.9 45

50.4 33.5 39

4.5

EasyJet

310

35.0 0

35

47.0 16.6 42

-12.0

Eurowings

143

40.0 0

40

49.5 19.2 44

-9.5

Lufthansa

139

49.2 4.2

50

50.2 9.9

49

-1.0

46.7 3.8

45

55.8 17.4 50

-9.1

British Airways 75

SD

Median

MA

SD

Median MS - MA

Note. All turnarounds included other than night stops.
a
Actual turnaround times were calculated by subtracting early arrivals and average taxi
times from the actual ground time.

The method for data retrieval for Ryanair as the only home-based carrier
in this study allowed the calculation of some additional information, which was
not available for the other airlines. Out of a total of 92 days, the virtual FR aircraft
completed six legs on 59 days and eight legs on only 29 days during that period.
The average flight time was 97 minutes. Long turnarounds seemed to coincide
quite often with necessary crew-changes, for example after two or four legs at
home-base.
Block Times
Hao and Hansen (2013) pointed out the correct set of scheduled block
times to minimize costs for airlines. Therefore it was expected that all airlines
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operating to and from VLC would set block times in a similar manner because the
expenses for this procedure are expected to be low in comparison to the
mentioned costs of positive and negative delay in the literature review.
Average scheduled block times (ASBT) were calculated and compared to
the sum of the average flight time and the average taxi-in, and taxi-out time at the
respective airports (Table A1), which represent average actual block times
(AABT). The difference between AABT and ASBT was calculated for each citypair, and a weighted average was then retrieved for every carrier. Ryanair was
excluded from the calculations due to the relatively small number of flights
operated on each route it offers from VLC. The carrier conducted a maximum of
20 flights on the VLC-SCQ route (and vice versa), a number that was deemed too
small to calculate a meaningful average. In contrast to the assumptions based on
Hao and Hansen (2013), the differences among the four carriers are large and the
setting of scheduled block times seems to have different importance to each of the
carriers, as the results in Table 4 indicate.
EasyJet (U2) achieved the lowest weighted average in this study due to the
good fit of the scheduled block times for the route between LGW (London
Gatwick) and VLC, which was only one minute off for both directions. The routes
from and to LTN (London Luton) included more generously scheduled block
times, but due to the smaller number of flights, the impact on the weighted
average was limited. U2 is the only carrier in this study that used scheduled block
times, which varied depending on daytime and weekday.
Due to the limited number of considered routes for this case study, data
may differ considerably on other routes operated by the airlines. However, trends
are most probably observable for all routes and without much doubt, the type of
scheduled block times (variable/fixed) is constant over the whole network.
Financial Performance and Key Markers
The financial performance of all three low-cost carriers differed
significantly in the financial year 2016. FR achieved the highest absolute profit
and was at the same time able to reach the largest profit margin (26.4%). This was
partially due to a one-off “gain of €317.5 million on the sale of the Company’s . .
. shareholding in Aer Lingus” (Ryanair, 2016, p. 95). In contrast, EasyJet reached
a significantly lower profit per passenger and per aircraft, which also resulted in a
lower, but still, impressive profit margin (14.6%) compared to other players in the
industry. Eurowings is the only carrier in this study, which was not able to reach
profitability in 2016. The company was restructured lately and profits are spread
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over a large network of affiliated companies and airlines that cooperate with
Eurowings (Lufthansa Group, 2017). Results are displayed in Table 6.
Table 4
Block Time Comparison
Airline City Pair

n

ASBT

AABT

Delta a

Type b

U2

LGW-VLC

271

139

138

1

variable

VLC-LGW

271

148

149

-1

variable

LTN-VLC

39

151

145

6

variable

VLC-LTN

39

148

143

5

variable

DUS-VLC

91

150

144

6

fixed

VLC-DUS

91

140

143

-3

fixed

STR-VLC

52

140

127

13

fixed

VLC-STR

52

140

129

11

fixed

FRA-VLC

183

140

136

4

fixed

VLC-FRA

181

145

140

5

fixed

MUC-VLC

49

140

138

2

fixed

VLC-MUC

48

140

133

7

fixed

LGW-VLC

75

145

136

9

fixed

VLC-LGW

75

150

145

5

fixed

Wt
Avg

0.7

EW

5.3

LH

4.5

BA

7.0
Note. All times are calculated in minutes.
a
Delta = ASBT – AABT; Negative numbers indicate an overshoot of the scheduled block
time.
b
The type field indicates if block times are scheduled with a fixed length (fixed) or if
variation (variable) occurs depending on the time of the day or other variables.
c
Weighted average
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Table 6
Financial Performance of LCCs and network airlines in FY2016
Carrier

FR a

U2 a

EW a

LH a,e

BA a

Profit Margin

21.5 % b

14.6 %

< 0f

7.4% f

12.1 %

Load Factor

92.8 %

91.6 %

79.6 %

79.1 %

81.2 %

On-time Performance
(STA + 15 minutes)

> 90 %

75 % c

4U 91 % c
EW 90 % c

82.4 % c

78.4 % g

Profit Before Tax [million]

1,404 €

405 £

-91 € d

1,135 € d

1,566 £

13.20 € b

6.77 £

<0

18.18 €

35.19 £

1.93 £

<0

3.24 €

5.34 £

Per PAX

Per aircraft [million] 4.01 € b
a

All data extracted from respective business reports (Ryanair, 2016, EasyJet, 2016,
Lufthansa, 2016, British Airways Plc.,2017) unless otherwise stated. b Corrected by the
one-off effect of Air Lingus shares sale. c Datum from OAG (2016) d adjusted EBIT (EBT
not reported). e Lufthansa Passenger Airlines including regional partners f EBIT Margin g
Datum Oct 16 to Sep 2017 from OAG (2017)

Discussion
The on-time performance results are in line with the research conducted
by Jetzki (2009) who noted that “one low-cost carrier notably runs on a different
strategy” (p. 58), without naming the airline. After the results presented above,
this airline can now be identified as Ryanair with the utmost probability. And
unexpectedly, the results do not indicate that LCCs calculate more delay than
other airlines. At Valencia airport, Ryanair shows even better on-time
performance than traditional carriers.
While Ryanair enjoys the reputation of turning around aircraft in 30
minutes or less, the data obtained at VLC indicate differently. Here, Ryanair
completed 509 turnarounds other than night stops, with a mean duration of 40
minutes (Mdn = 30, SD = 31.9). This means that half of their turnarounds must
have been planned to last more than 30 minutes. In fact, at VLC there was not a
single instance in which an aircraft from their fleet was scheduled to be turned
around within 30 minutes for two consecutive turnarounds, and half of their
turnarounds at VLC were scheduled to last more than 45 minutes.
It is remarkable that Ryanair, rated as the most low-cost-orientated carrier
by Klophaus et al. in 2012, did not plan the expected short turnaround times at
VLC. Instead, Ryanair used scheduling practices, which are closer to those used
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by Lufthansa and British Airways than other low-cost carriers. This indicates that
Ryanair’s good on-time performance may a result of considerably longer
scheduled turnarounds in comparison to their LCC-competitors.
In comparison, Ryanair is the only carrier that completed its turnarounds
on average faster than scheduled, with Lufthansa following second. With a
median of 45 minutes for scheduled turnaround times, Ryanair, along with
Lufthansa (50 minutes) and British Airways (45 minutes) differs considerably
from other LCCs such as Easy Jet and Eurowings. On average and remarkable
due to the associated costs, Ryanair flights arrived early. Arriving early allowed
Ryanair to effectively absorb delay built during turnarounds at VLC, thus
achieving good on-time performance values at this airport.
In general, carriers may decide to either trade on-time performance for
higher utilization rates or accept lower airtime per airplane and day in exchange
for better punctuality and customer satisfaction. Ryanair seems to prioritize being
on-time, while EasyJet seems to accept a delay to achieve better utilization rates.
Eurowings and EasyJet came in last regarding on-time performance. In
contrast to all other airlines, Eurowings was not able to depart early in a single
instance; hence, turnaround procedures and practices seem to differ significantly
from those used by Ryanair. In fact, Eurowings spent on average ten minutes
longer at the parking position than intended. However, an evaluation of block
time settings did not reveal any strategic reasoning behind this delay.
Ryanair mastered the two-fold trade-off problem between aircraft
utilization and on-time performance best by combining the company’s ability to
turn around aircraft quickly with efficient scheduling, which allows sufficient
ground time to absorb delays and operational disturbances. In contrast, EasyJet
had the largest overshoot of scheduled turnaround times due to tightly scheduled
block times, which led to a considerably lower on-time performance.
The success of these various ground operations strategies can ultimately
only be measured in economic terms. Out of the three LCCs in this study, Ryanair
is the most profitable company. In contrast, Easy Jet exhibits similar load factors
as Ryanair and an albeit lower (nevertheless impressive) profit margin but shows
significantly lower on-time performance.
Eurowings, in turn, underwent a restructuring process in 2016 and its
parent company Lufthansa is still investing considerable amounts of money to
enable the growth of this LCC in the highly competitive European low-cost
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market. Due to these circumstances, Eurowings was not profitable in 2016, and no
correlations between financial performance and its operational strategy can yet be
made.
The two hub-and-spoke airlines Lufthansa and British Airways, which
were included in this paper for similar reasons, reached a lower profit margin in
2016 along with significantly lower load factors than the LCCs. However, both
companies generated an overall more profit per passenger than any of the lowcost airlines. This may be due to their large long-haul fleets and the associated
higher prices customers are willing to pay for their services – to include reliable
on-time performance. However, as this study has shown, the alleged better ontime performance of traditional carriers may be nothing more than a myth.
The hypothesis that the gains of lower on-time performance of low-cost
carriers outweigh the associated costs must be rejected based on the results found
for Ryanair and Easy Jet. While both airlines reach high-profit margins, Ryanair
operates more profitable and shows higher on-time performance values at the
same time. Apart from that, the findings of this study support the theory that
hybridization of the European low-cost sector, which was first proposed by
Klophaus et al. in 2012, has advanced to an operational level: LCCs become
increasingly sensitive toward customer satisfaction.
Overall and on an operational level, economic success seems to be
associated with the ability of an airline to turn around aircraft quickly, to build
schedules that incorporate realistic ground and block times with enough buffer to
absorb delay, and the associated high on-time performance to satisfy customers.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Work
There are some limitations associated with this study and
recommendations for future work may be derived from most of these. The most
significant limitation is the close focus on VLC airport, which does not allow
gaining a larger picture of operational strategies. Only Ryanair’s operation was
captured through the tail tracking methodology first introduced by Kondo (2008),
and the results were promising. This methodology seems to provide a useful tool
for a larger analysis of several airlines and airports over an extended time.
Ryanair performed quite well over the period under evaluation, but it
remains unclear if the operation from VLC as a home base had an impact on ontime performance and turnaround times, a topic that requires further investigation.
Also, the number of flown legs per day was only captured for FR, and further
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evaluation of the other carriers is necessary to gain an insight into average leg
lengths and scheduling strategies. This may have a considerable impact on the
strategy, utilization rate, and personnel requirements.
Ryanair was found to leave before STD in some times, a case that was
only found in rare circumstances in the data of other carriers. This gives reason to
suspect that the turnaround strategy of Ryanair may be somewhat different in
comparison to the strategies of all other airlines and may add to the successful
performance.
Conclusion
The clear line between low-cost and non-low-cost airlines has become
blurred through the hybridization of the European low-cost market. The observed
differences between low-cost carriers compared to traditional airlines were small
regarding on-time performance, turnaround scheduling, block-time setting, and
turnaround performance at VLC airport. Ryanair’s two-fold strategy as the most
successful European low-cost carrier consists of the ability to perform short
turnarounds while allowing a generously planned schedule at the same time,
which overall results in better on-time performance. EasyJet, in turn, focuses on
maximizing aircraft utilization through optimized block-time setting, thereby
accepting a lower on-time performance.
It is likely that the hybridization of the low-cost sector will eventually
force traditional airlines to follow the business models of their low-cost
competitors. Consequently, the line between low-cost and traditional airlines will
be further dissolved.
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Appendix
Table A1
Average Taxi-In and Taxi-Out Times for selected Airports
Taxi-In

Taxi-Out

Airport
M

SD

Median

M

SD

Median

DUS

5

2

5

12

4

11

FRA

9

4

8

14

6

13

LGW

7

4

7

20

9

19

LTN

6

3

5

15

9

13

MUC

6

2

5

12

8

12

STR

5

3

5

10

5

10

VLC

4

2

4

11

4

10

Note. All results are in minutes. Data was retrieved from EUROCONTROL (2016a, 2016b) for the
summer 2016.
Table A2
ANOVA Comparison of Departure Delay including post-hoc Tukey HSD results
Tukey’s HSD Comparisons
Airline

FR

U2

EW

n

Mean

SD

FR

300

17.1

27.5

U2

310

38.5

31.4

< .0001

EW

143

37.7

31.8

< .0001

0.9978

LH

229

18.3

14.3

0.9841

< .0001

< .0001

BA

75

25.7

22.2

0.0904

0.0021

0.0161

LH

0.2297

Note. All results are in minutes.
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